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A CONTRADICTION OF THE RIGHT KIND:
CONVENIENCE KILLING AND KANT’S FORMULA
OF UNIVERSAL LAW
By Pauline Kleingeld
One of the most important difficulties facing Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is its apparent
inability to show that it is always impermissible to kill others for the sake of convenience. This difficulty
has led current Kantian ethicists to de-emphasize the FUL or at least complement it with other Kantian
principles when dealing with murder. The difficulty stems from the fact that the maxim of convenience
killing fails to generate a ‘contradiction in conception’, producing only a ‘contradiction in the will’ when
subjected to the twofold test associated with the FUL. This result is thought to imply that the FUL
allows us sometimes to kill for the sake of convenience. In this essay, I argue that the very diagnosis
of the problem rests on a mistake, and that if the maxim of convenience killing generates a contradiction
in the will, then acting on it is never permissible.
Keywords: categorical imperative, contradiction, Formula of Universal Law, Im-
manuel Kant, imperfect duties, killing, latitude.
INTRODUCTION
Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is widely considered to be incapable
of showing that killing others for the sake of one’s convenience is absolutely im-
permissible.1 Understandably, the FUL’s alleged implication that convenience
killing is sometimes permissible is taken to undercut its standing as a moral
principle. Moreover, it seems to be markedly at odds with the main tenets of
Kant’s moral theory, his own discussions of the prohibition on murder (MM
6:331–6),2 and the results one seems to get when applying the Formula of
Humanity.
1 See, for example, Allison (2011: 194, 202–3); Glasgow (2003: 45, n.31); Herman (1993: 113–31);
Timmons (2017: 96); and Wood (2008: 74).
2 References to Kant’s texts are to Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, published under the auspices of
the Berlin-Brandenburg (formerly Royal Prussian) and Go¨ttingen Academies (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter and predecessors, 1900—). Kant’s writings are cited by the abbreviated title, volume,
and page numbers. Abbreviations: G = Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, CPrR =
Critique of Practical Reason, MM = Metaphysics of Morals. Translations are my own, but I
C© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St
Andrews. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the
work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For
commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
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The charge that the FUL mishandles maxims of ‘murder and mayhem’
(Herman 1993) has had a significant impact on contemporary Kantian ethics.
It has contributed to a tendency to de-emphasize the FUL, and even those who
defend the formula admit that the problem cannot fully be solved (Korsgaard
1996: 97–101), or at least not without taking recourse to principles extraneous
to the FUL itself (Nyholm 2015: 63; Reath 2006: 217, 230n.49; see Section II).
It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the FUL’s treatment of convenience
killing (and other maxims of murder andmayhem) is one of the main problems
facing this central principle of Kant’s ethics, if not the main problem.
The reason the problem is deemed so serious is that there is no easy fix,
because it is tied to a core feature of Kant’s account of the test associated
with the FUL, namely the fact that there are two ways in which a maxim
can generate a contradiction. The maxim of convenience killing seems to
generate the wrong kind of contradiction for showing convenience killing to
be absolutely impermissible. The maxim does not lead to what is commonly
called a ‘contradiction in conception’, but only to a ‘contradiction in the
will’. This result is thought to imply that we may sometimes kill for the sake of
convenience, because contradictions in the will are associated with violations
of ‘imperfect’ duties, and imperfect duties permit the agent a certain latitude. I
call this problem the Latitude Problem.
Other seemingly problematic results of the FUL—discussed in the literature
under the heading of ‘false positives and false negatives’—have classic Kantian
rebuttals,3 but the Latitude Problem has seemed insurmountable thus far. As
Mark Timmons rightly notes, in his detailed and extensive overview of the
scholarly discussion concerning Kant’s FUL, ‘most all contemporary com-
mentators agree’ that acts of murder are not classified as violations of perfect
duty and that this is a serious problem (2017: 96). Similarly, at the end of his sur-
vey of the debate concerning the Latitude Problem, Henry Allison concludes
that this difficulty is the ‘main problem’ for the FUL (or, as he prefers, the
Formula of the Law of Nature [FLN]) and ‘sufficient to undermine’ it (2011:
203).
In this essay, I argue that the Latitude Problem is merely apparent because
the diagnosis of the problem rests on amistake.My strategy will not be to argue
that the maxim of convenience killing does, after all, lead to a contradiction
in conception. Rather, I show that it is a mistake to assume that if the maxim
of convenience killing leads only to a contradiction in the will, then it follows
that we may sometimes kill for the sake of our convenience. I first discuss in
have benefited from the translations available in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–2016).
3 See especially O’Neill (1989: 83–104) andKorsgaard (1996: 77–105). For additional andmore
recent helpful discussions of the issue of ‘false positives’ and ‘false negatives’, see Allison (2011:
190–203); Bojanowski (2017); Cholbi (2016: 151–60); McCarty (2015); Nyholm (2015: 25–69); and
Sensen (2014).
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66 PAULINE KLEINGELD
more detail how the Latitude Problem is thought to emerge, pointing out that
it rests on an alleged parallel with nonbeneficence (Section I) and explain-
ing why two previously proposed solutions leave the basic problem intact
(Section II). I then argue that the Latitude Problem stems from the
conflation of two types of nonbeneficence, only one of which is morally per-
missible according to Kant. This makes it possible to show that if the maxim
of convenience killing leads to a contradiction in the will when subjected to
the test articulated by the FUL, then killing others for the sake of one’s con-
venience is never permissible (Section III). In the final section, I address three
worries related to this solution (Section IV).
I. HOW THE LATITUDE PROBLEM IS THOUGHT TO ARISE
In her influential essay titled ‘Murder and Mayhem’, Barbara Herman diag-
noses the Latitude Problem in a way that clearly reveals the argument that
underlies it.4 She develops her argument using the example of the maxim of
‘convenience killing’, that is, the maxim to ‘kill whenever that is necessary to
get what I want’ (1993: 117).5 To explain how the problem arises, Herman
draws on familiar core tenets of Kant’s Groundwork: the Categorical Imperative
(in particular, the FUL),6 Kant’s claim that maxims can fail the relevant test in
two ways, and the associated distinction between perfect and imperfect duties.
The FUL reads as follows: ‘Act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can simultaneously will that it become a universal law’ (G 4:421,
emphasis in original). A maxim is a person’s action principle (G 4:421n.; CPrR
5:19), that is, amajor premise in an agent’s practical reasoning. Based onKant’s
discussion of the four famous examples in the Groundwork, the FUL is generally
interpreted as demanding that each of one’s maxims pass a two-stage test. As
4 An earlier version can be found in Dietrichson (1969).
5 Fully specified, this maxim would be the following: ‘I shall kill others to get what I want
whenever that is necessary to get what I want’. One may well doubt whether this is an accurate
description of the real maxim (personal action principle, policy) of people who kill for the sake of
convenience. Their maximwill usually bemore general than this formulation, in that they are not
specifically committed to killing others for the sake of convenience: they would just as easily injure
them, knock them unconscious, or push them out of the way if doing so was necessary, and their
set of instruments may further include psychological harm, financial ruin, or social ostracism.
Indeed, it may be that their maxim is actually the very general principle of subordinating others’
interests to their own. For the purpose of this essay, however, I discuss the maxim as Herman
formulates it.
6 Herman explains the problem as being associated with ‘the CI procedure’. This term is not
meant to refer to all formulations of the Categorical Imperative, however, but only to the criterion
articulated in the FUL or FLN. The Formula of Humanity, for example, is not usually thought
to fall victim to the problem Herman diagnoses. Therefore, it is potentially confusing to refer to
the problem as affecting the Categorical Imperative in general. To avoid such confusion, I focus
the discussion on the FUL. Kant introduces the FUL as the main statement of the Categorical
Imperative (G 4:421) and presents the FLN as an alternate version of it (G 4:421).
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Herman describes the test, one should ask whether a world in which everyone
acts on themaxim ‘can be conceivedwithout contradiction and, if it can, whether
it can also be willed (. . . ) without that will contradicting itself ’ (1993: 118,
emphasis added). If a world in which the maxim is a universal law cannot
coherently be conceived, we get what is commonly called a ‘contradiction in
conception’; if such a world can be conceived but cannot rationally be willed,
we get a ‘contradiction in the will’.
Furthermore, Kant posits a correlation between the two stages in the test
and the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. He matches the first
type of contradiction with (violations of) perfect duties: duties that leave the
agent no latitude. An example is the duty not to make false promises: making
false promises is strictly prohibited; it is never morally permissible.
Kant matches the second type of contradiction with (violations of) imperfect
duties: duties that allow the agent latitude in determining how, when, where, and
to what extent he will discharge them. The duty of beneficence, for example,
is not a duty to help everyone everywhere who needs any kind of help. Rather,
it is a duty to adopt the maxim of beneficence, that is, to include the maxim in the
set of action principles one uses in one’s practical reasoning. It is left up to the
agent to determine more specifically how, when, where, and to what extent he
will help others, in light of further considerations, such as his other duties and
personal circumstances. Importantly, this entails that it is not always wrong to
refrain from acting beneficently, and hence that nonbeneficence is sometimes
permissible.
Given the common view of convenience killing as a prime example of
absolutely immoral behaviour, Herman argues, we might expect the maxim
of convenience killing to lead to a ‘contradiction in conception’, but this is
not the result we get. A world in which the maxim of convenience killing
was a universal law would be a world with much more violence, but such a
world, although unpleasant and less populous, is not inconceivable; indeed,
she writes, ‘Hobbes described it in some detail’ (1993: 118). Since such a world
can be consistently conceived, she argues, the maxim of convenience killing
does not fail the ‘contradiction in conception’ test (1993: 118).
Herman regards it as possible, however, to show that the maxim fails the
test in the second stage. She argues that willing a world in which everyone acts
on the maxim of convenience killing contradicts something that I must will if I
will anything at all—namely, the necessary conditions of my continued agency.
Willing a universal ‘Hobbesian condition’ conflicts with willing the necessary
conditions of my continued agency, since the latter includes willing that others
treat my existence as a limiting condition on their actions (1993: 121). In this
way, Herman maintains, the maxim leads to a ‘contradiction in the will’.
Having thus set the stage, Herman then shows how the Latitude Problem
arises. She argues that if the maxim of convenience killing fails the test only in
the second stage, it is associated with the violation of an imperfect duty. Since
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68 PAULINE KLEINGELD
Kant maintains that agents have latitude as to the implementation of their
imperfect duties, however, the fact that the maxim fails only the ‘contradiction
in the will’ test entails that the agent has a certain latitude with regard to
convenience killing. In particular, Herman argues, it seems to imply that it is
not always impermissible to kill for the sake of convenience.
Herman develops this point by comparing the case of convenience killing
to that of nonbeneficence. It seems that if agents have latitude in the case of
nonbeneficence, then they must also have latitude in the case of convenience
killing. After all, the maxim of convenience killing fails the FUL test in the
same way that the maxim of nonbeneficence does. Comparing the failure of
themaximof convenience killing to the failure of themaximof nonbeneficence,
Herman formulates the problem as follows:
The prohibition we would seem to get, following the beneficence example, is a duty
not to have a general policy of killing for self-interest. But although we must not have
a policy of never helping, we may sometimes not help. Does it follow that, though we
must not have a policy of killing, we may sometimes kill? (1993: 123)
Herman does not see any way to avoid this implication and writes that Kant’s
theory seems to have the ‘odd’ implication of ‘sorting killing with nonbenefi-
cence’ (1993: 123). Her point here is not that killing is a kind of nonbeneficence.
Rather, the ‘sorting’ worry concerns the fact that the argument underlying the
prohibition on convenience killing is structurally similar to the argument un-
derlying the impermissibility of nonbeneficence, and hence that convenience
killing and nonbeneficence must have the same moral status.
Herman’s explanation of the Latitude Problem can be summarized as
follows:
1. Both in the case of the maxim of nonbeneficence and in the case of the
maxim of convenience killing, universalizing the maxim yields a contra-
diction in the will (rather than a contradiction in conception).
2. If the fact that the maxim of nonbeneficence yields a contradiction in
the will implies that the agent has latitude, such that nonbeneficence is
sometimes morally permissible, then the agent must also have latitude in
the case of convenience killing, such that convenience killing is sometimes
morally permissible.
Because the Latitude Problem emerges downstream of the observation that the
maxim leads only to a contradiction in the will, it does not depend on the
specific details of Herman’s own construal of this contradiction. For the sake
of the argument of this essay, I shall simply assume that the maxim of con-
venience killing leads to a contradiction in the second stage of the FUL test,
without specifying this test in terms of any particular interpretation of the FUL
or any specific construal of this contradiction. Herman develops her diagnosis
of the Latitude Problem by reference to Onora O’Neill’s interpretation of
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what the FUL demands (1993: 115 n.2),7 but the problem is widely thought
also to arise on other interpretations of the formula. For example, Christine
Korsgaard acknowledges that the problem emerges for her ‘Practical Contra-
diction’ interpretation (Korsgaard 1996: 82–5, 97–101; cf. Herman 1993: 188,
n.5)8; AllenWood, who defends a deflationary reading of the FUL, agrees with
Herman’s diagnosis (Wood 2008: 74); and the Latitude Problem would also
seem to emerge on Michael Cholbi’s ‘Rational Contradiction’ interpretation
(Cholbi 2016: 74–106) and onmy ‘Volitional Self-Contradiction’ interpretation
(Kleingeld 2017),9 again because the contradiction emerges only in the second
step of the testing procedure. In short, the Latitude Problem confronts the
FUL on a wide variety of interpretations of the criterion it articulates.
II. TWO CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS AND THE PROBLEM
THAT REMAINS
Some authors propose to solve the Latitude Problem by introducing auxiliary
assumptions with which a contradiction in conception can be generated for
the maxim of convenience killing. Sven Nyholm addresses the problem by
introducing elements related to the Formula of Humanity, namely the idea
that we ought to ‘preserve’ and ‘promote’ the humanity within each person
(G 4:430). He suggests that a world in which the maxim of convenience killing
is a universal law ‘is not conducive to the preservation and full realization of
the humanity within each person. It is instead in direct conflict with both of
these aims. So Herman’s objection fails’ (2015: 63). Nyholm argues that the
universalization of the maxim of convenience killing yields a world in which
the requirement to preserve humanity is violated, and because Kant associates
7 O’Neill responds to Herman by saying that the victims of killings cannot will the maxims of
their killers and that the maxim of convenience killing therefore cannot be willed by all (O’Neill
1989: 133). Herman could reply, however, that the maxim can be willed by all if it is evaluated
independently of knowledge of who will be killed by whom.
8 Korsgaard offers a partial solution and acknowledges that it does not fully solve the problem
(1996: 100). She suggests broadening the conception of the agent’s purpose so as to include
staying alive and being secure in the possession of what one wants. It is not immediately clear,
however, that secure possession of something is always part of the murder’s purpose.
9 The Volitional Self-Contradiction account of the FUL replaces the distinction between
‘contradictions in conception’ and ‘contradictions in the will’ with a distinction between two
ways in which self-contradictions in the will can emerge when maxims are subjected to the FUL
test. It labels such contradictions ‘volitional self-contradictions’ in part to distinguish them from
current understandings of ‘contradictions in thewill’. In this essay, I describe theLatitude Problem
in terms of the customary distinction between contradictions in conception and contradictions
in the will when discussing Herman’s diagnosis and the remedies proposed by others, since these
are the terms used in this debate. For the purpose of this essay it does not matter whether one
describes the second type of contradiction as a ‘contradiction in the will’ or as a ‘volitional
self-contradiction’—what matters is that it is the contradiction that emerges in the second step of
the test, since this is thought to cause the Latitude Problem.
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the failure to preserve humanity with a violation of strict duty, this means
that convenience killing is always impermissible. Nyholm’s strategy clearly
shows that Kant’s theory as a whole has the resources to reject convenience
killing absolutely. Because his strategy is based on elements Kant introduces in
contexts other than the FUL, however, it leaves entirely intact the impression
that the FUL on its own does not.
The same is true of a proposal by Andrews Reath, who suggests that in-
troducing the notion of autonomy may make it possible to generate a contra-
diction in conception for the maxim of convenience killing. Reath redescribes
convenience killing as the ‘attempt either to incapacitate or eliminate the
agency of another’ and argues that the universalization of the maxim, thus
understood, ‘defeats’ the unavoidable ‘presupposition of the agent’s [own]
autonomy’ (2006: 217, 230 n.49). This strategy, too, may help to show that
Kantian ethics can strictly condemn convenience killing, but because the no-
tion of autonomy is included neither in the original maxim of convenience
killing nor in the FUL as stated, it does not dispel the impression that the FUL
on its own fails to rule out convenience killing as absolutely impermissible,10 and
hence that the Latitude Problem remains a problem for the FUL as such.11
The reason why it is important to examine whether the FUL as such can han-
dle the Latitude Problem is that Kant repeatedly presents it as themost general
andmost important formulation of the principle of morality. In theGroundwork,
he introduces the FUL as ‘the’ categorical imperative. The other formulas, he
writes, are based on ‘a certain analogy’ (G 4:436, 437). He emphasizes that
the other formulas are useful for the purpose of bringing the basic idea ‘closer
to intuition’, but that the ‘general formula’ of the categorical imperative is to
be preferred over the other formulas when it comes to moral evaluation. For
the purpose of moral assessment one should follow ‘the strict method’ and
use the ‘general formula of the categorical imperative’ (G 4:436), Kant states,
adding a formulation that is indeed close to the FUL. Furthermore, his formu-
lation of the principle of morality in the Critique of Practical Reason resembles the
Groundwork’s FUL (CPrR 5:30), and the same is true of his formulation of ‘the’
Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysics of Morals (MM 6:225, 226, although
10 It also seems that convenience killing need not involve targeting the agency of the person
who is killed. The murderer may just want to remove an obstacle that happens to be a human
being, for example if the other is in a coma and her body is in the way.
11 Ted McNair argues that the maxim of convenience killing leads to a contradiction in
conception since ‘it is possible (indeed likely) that two persons may need to kill another person in
order to get what they want, while it would be impossible for them both to act effectively upon this
maxim’ (2000: 37). This implies, McNair claims, that the maxim cannot be a universal necessary
law (2000: 37). McNair’s argument crucially depends on his ‘Universal Necessity’ reading of the
FLN, however, and there does not seem to be textual support for the ‘necessary law’ condition
as such. Moreover, it is not impossible for two people to kill a third person; and if one of them
does so before the other, the other simply no longer needs to kill the third person in order to get
what she or he wants.
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in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant also makes use of the Formula of Humanity).
In other words, Kant repeatedly highlights the FUL and its close relatives as
the most important articulation of the principle of morality.
III. WHY THE LATITUDE PROBLEM IS MERELY APPARENT
I turn now to showing why it does not follow from Kant’s account of the
FUL that it is sometimes morally permissible to kill for the sake of convenience.
The Latitude Problem derives from an overlooked ambiguity in the notion of
‘nonbeneficence’ that proves to be central to Herman’s account of how the
problem arises. Due to this ambiguity, latitude in applying a maxim that passes
the FUL test is mistakenly thought to permit acting on a maxim that fails it.
III.1. A simple solution
Let me start by observing that the wording of the FUL does not seem to permit
any leeway at all regarding maxims that fail the test. On the face of it, there
seems to be no possibility for the Latitude Problem even to arise, since the
maxim of convenience killing simply does not satisfy the criterion articulated
in the FUL. The formula requires that you act ‘only’—not: ‘usually’ or ‘for the
most part’—in accordance with maxims that you can simultaneously will to
become universal laws (G 4:421, quoted above). This implies that if a maxim
violates this criterion by yielding a contradiction when submitted to the test,
you are not permitted to act on the maxim. The wording of the FUL does not
permit any latitudewith regard tomaxims that fail the test and does not contain
any qualifications concerning the kind of contradiction they yield. This entails
that if the maxim of convenience killing leads to a contradiction in the will, it is
never permissible to act on it. It therefore follows rather straightforwardly from
the FUL as stated that acting on the maxim of convenience killing is plainly
impermissible. Put differently, the Latitude Problem seems to have a very
simple solution. If the maxim of convenience killing leads to a contradiction
when subjected to the FUL test, then it is never permissible to act on it—
regardless of whether the contradiction emerges in the first or the second stage
of the test.
Despite following straightforwardly from the wording of the FUL, this
solution may appear to be a bit too simple. Kant also states in the Groundwork
that maxims that cannot be conceived as universal laws involve violations of
‘strict or narrow (unremitting) duty’, whereas maxims that fail the test in the
second stage involve violations ‘only of wide (meritorious) duty’ (G 4:424). One
might take this to indicate that there is some leeway regarding the second
category, and that convenience killing would constitute merely a lack of moral
merit rather than a violation of an absolute prohibition.
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The text suggests otherwise, however. Kant claims, with regard to both
sets of failing maxims, that acting on such maxims ‘conflicts with duty’ (der
Pflicht widerstreite, G 4:424). He calls acting on such maxims a ‘violation’ or
‘transgression’ of duty (U¨bertretung, G 4:424, see also MM 6:390, discussed
below). He goes on to criticize making exceptions for oneself, referring to
maxims that yield a ‘contradiction in our own will’ (G 4:424). Nothing in these
statements suggests that it is sometimes permissible to act on maxims that
yield a contradiction in the will. Far from allowing the occasional action on a
maxim that fails the test in the second stage, they underscore that if a maxim
yields a contradiction in the will, it is strictly impermissible to act on it.
III.2. The alleged parallel with nonbeneficence
This prompts the question why exactly the Latitude Problem is thought to
emerge in the first place.What part of Kant’s argument is supposed to yield the
conclusion that it is sometimes permissible to kill for the sake of convenience,
even though the maxim of convenience killing fails the criterion articulated in
the FUL?
It is worth noting that those who defend this conclusion are not appealing
to any explicit statement on Kant’s part to the effect that it is sometimes per-
missible to act on maxims that fail the test. Rather, it is thought to follow from
an alleged parallel between how the FUL handles the maxim of convenience
killing and how it handles the maxim of nonbeneficence. As we have seen,
Herman’s reasoning runs as follows: the maxim of nonbeneficence fails in the
second stage of the FUL test, yet it is sometimes permissible to be nonbenefi-
cent. The maxim of convenience killing also fails in the second stage, so it must
follow that it is sometimes permissible to kill for the sake of convenience. The
Latitude Problem owes its existence entirely to this alleged parallel between
convenience killing and nonbeneficence.
The parallel between the cases of nonbeneficence and convenience killing,
however, is merely apparent: it depends on an equivocation. The impression
that the FUL condones the occasional murder is due to the conflation of
two different types of ‘nonbeneficence’, each with a different moral status.
In order to show this, I first consider Kant’s account of the moral status of
nonbeneficence and then use this analysis to solve (or rather dissolve) the
Latitude Problem.
III.3. The moral status of nonbeneficence
In the Groundwork, Kant claims that the maxim of nonbeneficence fails the
FUL test in the second stage of the procedure, yielding a contradiction in
the will (G 4:423). Elsewhere, he argues that we have a duty to adopt the
maxim of beneficence instead (G 4:441; CPrR 5:34–5; MM 6:393, 450–4). He
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characterizes this duty of beneficence as ‘imperfect’ or ‘wide’, in the sense that
we have latitude as to its implementation. This latitude concerns acting on the
maxim of beneficence.
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explicitly notes that this latitude implies
that it is sometimes permissible to refrain from acting beneficently, but he adds
an important proviso. He explains that nonbeneficence is permissible only if
one has adopted the maxim of beneficence and ‘limits’ this maxim by another
maxim of duty. Using the latitude regarding beneficence as his example, Kant
argues that a wide duty means ‘not the permission to make exceptions to the
maxim of the actions, but only the permission to limit one maxim of duty by
the other’ (MM 6:390).12
Kant goes on to contrast moral merit both with moral deficiency and with
vice. He distinguishes the fulfilment of imperfect duty, which he calls ‘merit
(meritum)=+a’, from two types of ‘transgression’ or ‘violation’ (U¨bertretung, MM
6:390, see also MM 6:224 and 227). The first type of violation is the failure to
adopt amaxim of promoting amorally obligatory end, for example the failure to
adopt the maxim of beneficence. Kant writes that this constitutes a ‘deficiency
in moral worth = 0’ (MM 6:390). The fact that he assigns a ‘0’ to this moral
deficiency should not be misunderstood as meaning that it is morally neutral
or permissible. After all, one ought to fulfil one’s duties of virtue and adopt
the corresponding maxims. In terms of Kant’s moral accounting analogy, one
ought to have a positive score. This is why he labels the lack of moral worth
a ‘violation’ of duty in the first place. The second type of violation is the
‘intentional violation’, which constitutes ‘demerit (demeritum) = -a’ or vice (MM
6:390). Kant writes that vice obtains when it is a subject’s ‘principle [Grundsatz]
not to comply with such [i.e. imperfect] duties’ (MM 6:390).
Given these distinctions, ‘nonbeneficence’ has three possiblemeanings, each
of which corresponds to a different moral status. It can refer (1) to an agent’s
limiting his adopted maxim of beneficence by another maxim of duty; (2)
to an agent’s failing to adopt the maxim of beneficence, without the agent
adopting the maxim of nonbeneficence; or (3) to an agent’s acting on the
maxim of nonbeneficence. Nonbeneficence of the first type is permissible, but
nonbeneficence of the second or third type is not. The second constitutes a
lack of virtue and the third constitutes vice.
In terms of this taxonomy, then, the only type of nonbeneficence that is
morally permissible is the first. Acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence is
12 In the Groundwork Kant defines perfect (strict) duties as duties that allow ‘no exception
in favour of inclination’ (G 4:421n.), and readers might be inclined to infer that he holds that
imperfect duties do allow for such exceptions. This inference is not warranted, however. Kant
is here drawing a contrast between the scholastic understanding of perfect duties and his own, so
the comment does not regard his understanding of imperfect duties. Moreover, in the Groundwork
Kant emphatically refuses to commit to the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties,
stressing that he uses it merely to organize his examples and postponing proper treatment of the
division of duties until the Metaphysics of Morals (G 4:421n.).
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a form of vice, since an agent who adopts the maxim (action principle) of
nonbeneficence clearly makes it his ‘principle not to comply’ with the duty of
beneficence—to put it in the terminology of the previous quotation.
But what is meant by one’s maxims of duty ‘limiting’ each other? Well-
known examples in the Kantian literature include cases in which maxims of
wide duty are limited by maxims of strict duty. For example, the maxim of
beneficence is limited by the maxim never to lie: it is morally impermissible
to benefit some people by lying to others. Furthermore, maxims of wide duty
may limit each other. Consider the example of the wide duty of beneficence
and the wide duty to develop your talents. Sometimes you can fulfil both duties
at the same time, developing your talents by helping others, as in the case of a
medical student working as a volunteer in a disaster relief program. In other
situations, you will have to choose, and in such cases acting on the maxim
of beneficence limits your acting on the maxim of developing your talents,
or vice versa. This should not be misunderstood as your renouncing the one
maxim in favour of the other. Rather, you remain committed to both principles
but limit the one by the other. For example, you may put the development of
your talents temporarily on hold for the sake of helping someone in need, or,
conversely, you may temporarily put your beneficent activities on hold while
you are studying for exams. Kant illustrates this point by saying that one’s
parental duties may limit one’s general beneficence (MM 6:390).
In all of this, there is latitude only with regard to maxims of duty. Nonbenef-
icence is permissible only in cases where the agent has adopted the maxim of
beneficence but limits this maxim of duty by another maxim of duty. Non-
beneficence is impermissible, however, when the agent fails to adopt the maxim
of beneficence (lack of virtue) or acts on the maxim of nonbeneficence (vice),
that is, on the principle of never helping others. In other words, there certainly
is latitude regarding the fulfilment of the duty of beneficence, but this does not
include permission to act on maxims that fail the test articulated in the FUL.
Nowhere does Kant state that it is sometimes permissible to act on the maxim
of nonbeneficence.
III.4. How the Latitude Problem disappears
In the context of the discussion of the Latitude Problem, only two of the three
types of nonbeneficence are in play. Given the way in which Herman devel-
ops her argument, her focus is not on nonbeneficence in the sense of a mere
failure to adopt the maxim of beneficence. We are not dealing with a mere
lack of virtue, since what is at issue is the occasional action on a maxim that
is assumed to yield a contradiction in the will: action on the maxim of con-
venience killing. I therefore set aside nonbeneficence in the sense of a lack of
virtue. I concentrate on the remaining two senses of ‘nonbeneficence’, which
I term ‘principled nonbeneficence’ and ‘principled-beneficence-on-standby’.
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Principled nonbeneficence involves acting on the maxim of nonbenefi-
cence, whereas principled-beneficence-on-standby involves not acting on one’s
adopted maxim of beneficence, for the sake of some other duty.
To illustrate the difference between these two types of nonbeneficence, let
me compare a Kantian agent and her vicious twin. Consider Immanuela, who
realizes that acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence is morally impermissible
and who instead has adopted, from duty, the maxim of beneficence. During
a particular week, she does not act on her maxim of beneficence, because
she is studying for her medical exams, in a remote location cut off from the
outside world. She is instead acting on her maxim of developing her socially
useful talents (cf. G 4:422), a maxim she has also adopted from duty. For that
whole week, she helps no one, but she certainly is not acting on the maxim of
nonbeneficence. Nothing in the set-up of this example implies that she is acting
on the basis of a principle of never helping anyone. She knows this maxim
to be impermissible, and she has not adopted it. Rather, she has adopted the
maxim of beneficence, but this maxim is currently ‘limited’ by her maxim of
developing her socially useful talents. She is still firmly committed to helping
others in need. If, during this week, she were to encounter an injured hiker
who had lost her way in the woods, she would offer assistance.
Now compare Immanuela to her vicious brother Vic who has adopted the
maxim of nonbeneficence and the maxim of convenience killing: he is firmly
committed to putting his own interests first. He, too, is studying for his medical
exams, being attracted to the study of medicine merely by the prospect of
a high income. If an injured hiker knocked on his door, Vic would ignore
her, and if the knocking started bothering him, he would kill her to stop the
noise. While they are studying for their exams neither Immanuela nor her
brother are engaging in beneficent activities, but the nature and moral status
of their ‘nonbeneficence’ is very different on account of the differences in
content and moral status of their maxims. Immanuela has adopted the maxim
of beneficence, but her beneficence is temporarily on standby. Vic has adopted
the maxim of nonbeneficence; he is nonbeneficent as a matter of principle.
Once we keep these two types of nonbeneficence distinct, the Latitude
Problem completely disappears. Recall that Herman’s argument has two steps.
She first claims that the maxim of convenience killing fails the FUL test in the
same way as the maxim of nonbeneficence, since in both cases universalizing
the maxim yields a contradiction in the will; next, she claims that if it is
sometimes permissible to be nonbeneficent, as Kant says it is, then it must
sometimes be permissible to kill for the sake of one’s convenience.
We can now see that Herman’s argument is invalid because she conflates
principled nonbeneficence and principled-beneficence-on-standby. ‘Non-
beneficence’ in the first step of her argument refers to principled nonbenefi-
cence, because this step concerns the maxim of nonbeneficence. ‘Nonbenefi-
cence’ in the second step refers to principled-beneficence-on-standby, because
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this step concerns morally permissible nonbeneficence. From the fact that it is
sometimes permissible not to act on one’s maxim of beneficence it does not follow that
it is sometimes permissible to act on the maxim of nonbeneficence. As a result, it does
not follow that it is sometimes permissible to act on the maxim of convenience
killing.
In other words, the fact that both the maxim of nonbeneficence and the
maxim of convenience killing fail the FUL test in its second stage (as granted
for the purpose of this essay) does not mean that it is permissible sometimes to
kill for the sake of convenience. If, as I have argued, Kant claims that acting
on the maxim of nonbeneficence is always impermissible, then acting on the
maxim of convenience killing must similarly be always impermissible—and
the Latitude Problem vanishes. The only permissible form of nonbeneficence
is principled-beneficence-on-standby, that is, nonbeneficence on the part of an
agent who has adopted the maxim of beneficence.
In sum, the fact that there is latitude with regard to principled beneficence
does not mean that there is latitude with regard to either principled nonbenef-
icence or convenience killing (or any other maxim that yields a contradiction
in the will). Once the ambiguity in the term ‘nonbeneficence’ is exposed, it is
clear that Kant’s assertion that we may sometimes refrain from helping does
not commit him to the claim that we may sometimes kill to get what we want.
III.5. The ‘sorting’ worry
Herman’s worry about the ‘oddness’ of ‘sorting killing with nonbeneficence’
can now also be put to rest. First, it is not odd but entirely appropriate to
‘sort’ acting on the maxim of convenience killing with acting on the maxim
of nonbeneficence. If both maxims yield a contradiction in the will when
subjected to the FUL test, then they have the samemoral status: both principled
nonbeneficence and convenience killing are absolutely impermissible.
Secondly, acting on the maxim of convenience killing does not get ‘sorted’
with principled-beneficence-on-standby. The maxim of convenience killing
fails the FUL test, and hence acting on this maxim is never morally permissible.
The maxim of beneficence passes the test, and not acting on one’s maxim of
beneficence is sometimes permissible. Given their very different moral status,
convenience killing does not belong in the same moral ‘box’ as principled-
beneficence-on-standby.
IV. THREE WORRIES
At this stage, one may be concerned that the proposed solution to the Lat-
itude Problem comes at a high cost, or even that the problem returns in
different form. First, it might seem that the Latitude Problem could easily be
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reintroduced by reformulating Herman’s argument in terms of a permissible
counterpart to the maxim of convenience killing. Secondly, it might seem that
the proposed solution of the Latitude Problem is at odds with Kant’s state-
ment that imperfect duties permit latitude, and hence that it merely trades
one problem for another. Thirdly, the discussion of these first two concerns
might seem to give rise to a new version of the ‘sorting’ worry. I address these
concerns in turn.
IV.1. Permissible counterpart maxims
First, itmight seem that the Latitude Problem can easily be reintroduced via the
construction of a morally permissible counterpart of the maxim of convenience
killing. Acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence is always impermissible, but
not acting on the maxim of beneficence is sometimes permissible. One might
therefore expect it to be possible to formulate a permissible counterpart to the
maxim of convenience killing, on a parallel with the maxim of beneficence,
such that not acting on that maxim would be sometimes permissible and allow
the occasional murder.
Weare now in a position to explain, however,whynot acting on apermissible
counterpart maxim will never suffice for an action to count as an instance of
convenience killing. As we have seen, ‘nonbeneficence’ is ambiguous between
the senses in which beneficence is negated. It admits of three construals,
only one of which is morally permissible, namely principled-beneficence-on-
standby. ‘Convenience killing’, by contrast, admits of only one construal: acting
on the maxim to kill when this is necessary to get what one wants. Its moral
status parallels that of principled nonbeneficence. Nomatter howwe formulate
the permissible counterpart to the maxim of convenience killing, therefore, not
acting on this maxim, for the sake of another duty, will never constitute killing
for the sake of convenience.
To further clarify this last point, let us take the following maxim that can
plausibly serve as a permissible counterpart to the maxim of convenience
killing: ‘I shall further the convenience of others’. Recall that acting on the
maxim of beneficence may be ‘limited’ by strict and wide duties. If we now
consider what it would mean to refrain from acting on the maxim to further
the convenience of others, for the sake of a strict or wide duty, we can easily
see that this does not amount to killing someone for the sake of convenience.
This is true even if someone dies as a result of the agent’s decision not to act
on the maxim: after all, the agent was motivated by duty, not by a concern for
her own convenience.
A similar analysis applies to the negatively formulatedmaxim ‘I shall not kill
others to get what I want’. Again, not acting on this maxim does not equal or
imply killing for the sake of convenience. To see why, assume that Immanuela
has adopted this maxim, and that on her way back from her study retreat she
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is shipwrecked and spends the rest of her life on an uninhabited island. She
knows that she is the only person there, and she now considers this maxim
irrelevant to her practical reasoning. Obviously, her not acting on the basis of
this maxim does not mean that she is killing anyone for the sake of getting
what she wants.
In sum, not acting on permissible counterpart maxims is insufficient for an
agent to count as killing for the sake of getting what she wants. To qualify as
such, the agent must kill someone and do so in order to get what she wants.13
Doing this involves acting on the maxim of convenience killing.
IV.2. Is there less latitude now?
The result that convenience killing is always impermissible might seem to
solve the Latitude Problem at the cost of creating a significant new difficulty.
I have been assuming that the maxim of convenience killing fails the FUL
test in the second stage and that it is a violation of imperfect duty (G 4:424).
According to Kant, imperfect duties permit latitude. So if acting on the maxim
of convenience killing is always impermissible, it might still seem that the result
of this paper comes at the price of contradicting Kant’s own statement that
imperfect duties permit latitude, or at least at the price of restricting this
latitude considerably.
This issue was partly addressed above by pointing out that the latitude of
imperfect duties concerns onlymaxims of duty, not impermissiblemaxims such
as the maxim of convenience killing. But the issue deserves further elaboration,
and it is instructive to return once again to the case of nonbeneficence.
Let us first ask: Which imperfect duty exactly is violated by acting on the
maxim of nonbeneficence? The answer is: the imperfect duty of beneficence. This
is what Kant says explicitly in the relevant passage in the Metaphysics of Morals
discussed above (MM 6:390), and this is uncontroversial in the literature. The
answer is not: the duty not to act on the maxim of nonbeneficence. Nowhere
does Kant suggest that the duty not to act on the maxim of nonbeneficence
is imperfect. The maxim of nonbeneficence fails the FUL test, and there is
no latitude with regard to maxims that fail the test. Acting on the maxim of
nonbeneficence is therefore simply prohibited. In fact, as I have alsomentioned
above, Kant states explicitly that the latitude of the duty of beneficence does
not include permission to act on the maxim of nonbeneficence (MM 6:390).
The latitude of imperfect duty does not include an incongruous permission
to act on maxims that fail the FUL test. Kant’s statement that principled
13 Furthermore, given that this maxim is formulated as a strict negation, any agent who
has adopted this maxim but does decide to kill for the sake of convenience would be making
an ‘exception to the maxim’, and this is something Kant explicitly condemns (MM 6:390). By
contrast, principled-beneficence-on-standby involves not an exception to the maxim but a limit
to the scope of its applicability.
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nonbeneficence is never permissible is therefore perfectly compatible with his
statement that the agent has latitude in determining how to discharge the duty
of beneficence.
If we now analyze the case of convenience killing along parallel lines, this
dispels the impression that the absolute impermissibility of convenience killing
implies a restriction of the latitude of imperfect duty. Assuming again that
the maxim of convenience killing has the same moral status as the maxim
of nonbeneficence, we can ask: Which imperfect duty exactly is violated by
acting on the maxim of convenience killing? The parallel with nonbeneficence
clarifies that the relevant imperfect duty should be understood on a parallel
with the duty of beneficence. Thus, the answer should be something like this:
the imperfect duty to promote the convenience of others. Or perhaps, more
generally: the imperfect duty to promote the happiness of others. In any event,
the answer to the question is not: the (allegedly) imperfect duty not to act on
the maxim of convenience killing. The maxim of convenience killing fails the
FUL test, and, again, there is no latitude with regard to maxims that fail the
test.
The parallel with nonbeneficence makes clear that the absolute impermis-
sibility of convenience killing does not amount to a restriction of the latitude
of imperfect duty, since Kant does not conceive of this latitude as including
permission to act on maxims that fail the FUL test in the first place. Thus, the
absolute impermissibility of convenience killing is fully compatible with Kant’s
statement that imperfect duties come with latitude.
IV.3. Does the ‘sorting’ worry return?
Although the Latitude Problem has been solved, there might be a lingering
feeling that the sorting worry has not been dispensed with entirely. Isn’t there
still a sense in which Kant’s position, as here reconstructed, trivializes con-
venience killing? If killing for the sake of convenience violates the imperfect
duty to promote the happiness of others, as suggested in Section IV.2., this
might seem to mean that murdering someone is wrong because the action fails
to promote the victim’s happiness. This might sound ‘odd’ enough to seem
problematic.
This worry betrays a misunderstanding, however, of Kant’s notion of im-
perfect duty. As explained in Section II, an imperfect duty is a duty to adopt
a particular maxim, not a duty to perform specific actions (MM 6:388–390).
The duty of beneficence is the duty to adopt the maxim of beneficence; the
agent has latitude concerning the particular beneficent actions he performs on
the basis of this maxim. Given this conception of imperfect duty, the murderer
is morally blameworthy not (‘merely’) on account of failing to perform actions
that further his victim’s happiness, but rather on account of his heinousmaxim,
namely the morally prohibited maxim of convenience killing.
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CONCLUSION
Now that the Latitude Problem has disappeared, we are left with the simple
solution, that is, with the straightforward account of the absolute impermis-
sibility of convenience killing outlined at the beginning of Section III. The
FUL requires that one act only on maxims that one can simultaneously will as
universal laws. The maxim of convenience killing does not meet this require-
ment since—as granted for the sake of the argument of this essay—it leads to
a contradiction in the will when subjected to the test. Therefore, acting on the
maxim of convenience killing is absolutely impermissible, just as acting on the
maxim of nonbeneficence is absolutely impermissible.
The argument of this essay extends to other maxims of ‘murder and may-
hem’ that fail the FUL test only in its second stage. If a maxim yields a
contradiction in the second step, then acting on the maxim is absolutely im-
permissible. The fact that the contradiction is of the second kind does not relax
the absolute impermissibility of acting on the maxim at issue. Any latitude for
the agent is on the side of the maxims of wide duty, not on the side of max-
ims that fail the test. In sum, the Latitude Problem is merely apparent, and
the FUL’s handling of the maxim of convenience killing does not give Kan-
tian ethicists reason to abandon it or to discount its significance as a moral
principle.14
REFERENCES
Allison, H. E. (2011) Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Oxford: OUP.
Bojanowski, J. (2017) ‘Thinking about Cases: Applying Kant’s Universal Law Formula’, European
Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12307.
Cholbi, M. (2016) Understanding Kant’s Ethics. Cambridge: CUP.
Dietrichson, P. (1969) ‘Kant’s Criteria of Universalizability’, in Robert Paul Wolff (ed) Kant:
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Text and Critical Essays, 163–207. Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill.
Glasgow, J. M. (2003) ‘Expanding the Limits of Universalization: Kant’s Duties and Kantian
Moral Deliberation’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33: 23–47.
Herman, B. (1993) The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kleingeld, P. (2017) ‘Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law’, Kant-Studien 108:
89–115.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: CUP.
McCarty, R. (2015) ‘False Negatives of the Categorical Imperative’, Mind 124: 177–200.
McNair, T. (2000) ‘Universal Necessity andContradictions inConception’,Kant-Studien 91: 25–43.
Nyholm, S. (2015) Revisiting Kant’s Universal Law and Humanity Formulas. Berlin: De Gruyter.
O’Neill, O. (1989) Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: CUP.
Reath, A. (2006) Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Selected Essays. Oxford: OUP.
14 I would like to thank Joel Anderson, Stefano Bacin, Katharina Bauer, Carolyn Benson,
Jochen Bojanowski, Sven Nyholm, J.P. Messina, and two anonymous referees for this journal for
helpful comments.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pq/article-abstract/69/274/64/5098492 by guest on 16 April 2019
A CONTRADICTION OF THE RIGHT KIND 81
Sensen, O. (2014) ‘Universalizing as a Moral Demand’, Estudos Kantianos 2: 169–84.
Timmons, M. (2017) Significance and System: Essays on Kant’s Ethics. Oxford: OUP.
Wood, A. W. (2008) Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: CUP.
University of Groningen, Netherlands
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pq/article-abstract/69/274/64/5098492 by guest on 16 April 2019
